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COMMENT
BODILY INTEGRITY: A SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO BE FREE FROM RAPE BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Between 1989 and 1991, David Lanier, a Tennessee State Chancery
Court Judge, forcibly raped or sexually assaulted five women in his cham-
bers. Following a jury trial, Lanier was convicted on two felony accounts
and five misdemeanor accounts of willfully depriving a person of constitu-
tional rights in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §242.' The felony convictions were
based on several incidents of forcible oral rape, while the misdemeanors
were based on various incidents of sexual assault.2 The trial court instructed
the jury that Lanier's indictment was based on a substantive due process
right to be free from unauthorized physical intrusion,3 essentially advising
the jury that the victims had a constitutional right to bodily integrity. The
Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Lanier's conviction, conclud-
ing that sexual assault could not be prosecuted in federal court as a violation
of the constitutional substantive due process right to bodily integrity.4 In
1. 18 U.S.C. § 242 provides that "[w]hoever, under color of any law .... willfully
subjects any person in any State, ... to the deprivation of any rights, ... secured or pro-
tected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, ... on account of such person being
an alien, or by reason of his color or race .... shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both.
• . ." 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996) [hereinafter Section 242]. See infra note 8 for a discussion of
application of this statute to rape assault by state actors.
2. One of the most extreme examples of Lanier's conduct involved a woman whose
divorce proceedings were previously handled in Judge Lanier's court. The woman had re-
ceived custody of her child, however, the child's custody remained subject to Judge La-
nier's jurisdiction. While the woman was applying for a secretarial position at the court-
house where Judge Lanier presided, Judge Lanier threatened to reopen the custody issue,
unless the woman accompanied him to his chambers. While in his chambers, Judge Lanier
grabbed the woman's hair and neck, forced her jaws open, forced his penis into her mouth
and ejaculated, all while threatening her that she would lose custody of her child if she re-
fused. See Elkan Abramowitz, 'U.S. v. Lanier': The 'Under Color of Law' Rule, N.Y. L.J.,
May 6, 1997, at 3; U.S. v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 648 (6th Cir. 1994).
3. See Frederick M. Lawrence, In the U.S. Supreme Court: Revisiting the Scope of
Federal Civil Rights Crimes-Is Sexual Assault by a State Judge a Federal Crime?, Jan. 9,
1997, available in 1997 WL 6056.
4. A unanimous panel on the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's convictions, relying on Ingraham v. Wright, discussed infra note 61, which estab-
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fact, the majority entirely rejected the existence of a substantive due process
right to bodily integrity. On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that
the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard for determining whether
the "fair warning requirement" of 18 U.S.C. §242 was satisfied.5 However,
the Supreme Court avoided declaring a constitutional right to freedom from
sexual assault, and actually failed to address whether there is a substantive
due process right to bodily integrity at all.
Although the Supreme Court avoided declaring bodily integrity a sub-
stantive due process right within the Fourteenth Amendment by denying
certiorari when the case came before it (again), the issue should not be ig-
nored. In fact, the implications of extending the constitutional right to bod-
ily integrity to encompass rape by officials would reach far beyond the La-
nier case. Specifically, a constitutional right to bodily integrity would
provide victims of rape and sexual assault by state actors with remedies that
might otherwise be unavailable.' Here, the civil rights statute implicated by
rape and sexual assault requires a deprivation of rights "secured or protected
lishes a substantive due process right to bodily integrity. See United States v. Lanier, 33
F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 1994). However, this judgment was vacated on a grant of rehearing en
bane, 43 F.3d 1033 (6th Cir. 1995), and upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals re-
versed Lanier's convictions. See United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996).
5. See U.S. v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1221 (1997). Instead of focusing on the con-
stitutional issues clearly implicated by the Lanier case, the Supreme Court addressed the
"made-specific" standard of fair warning enunciated in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945). In Screws, a plurality opinion declared that a criminal defendant could receive
the requisite notice that a constitutional right existed (and therefore that its deprivation was
a crime under § 242) only if the right had been "made specific by the express terms of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them." Id. at 104. In
focusing on this notice requirement, the majority in Lanier explained that the Court of Ap-
peals had applied a much too stringent standard. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1221. The majority
explained that the Screws' "made specific" requirement did not require a prior decision by
the United States Supreme Court to identify the existence of a constitutional right in a case
with facts fundamentally similar to the case being prosecuted. The majority remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals, explaining that a more relaxed standard of warning should be
applied. Specifically, the majority indicated that criminal liability "may be imposed under
§ 242 if, but only if, in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness of the defendant's
conduct is apparent." Id. at 1222. Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See
Lanier v. U.S., 118 S. Ct. 1200 (1998). However, cases involving similar facts will inevi-
tably be raised in the future.
6. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CoNST.
amend. XIV. The essence of substantive due process is that laws will be reasonable and
not arbitrary. The guarantee of substantive due process requires the court to review the
substance of the law itself rather than the procedure used. See, e.g., Michael Wells &
Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA.
L. REV. 201 (1984).
7. Although rape and sexual assault by state actors may appear to be a unique and iso-
lated problem, Department of Justice figures indicate that there have been seventeen such
prosecutions since 1989, including two judges besides Lanier who were convicted of as-
sault in violation of Section 242. See Abramowitz, supra note 2, at n.6.
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by the Constitution or laws of the United States."' Therefore, recognizing
that rape or sexual assault by a public official violates the substantive due
process right to bodily integrity would bring this conduct within the purview
of 18 U.S.C. §242. Once courts establish that rape by public officials vio-
lates a constitutional right, Section 242 provides alternate remedies, namely,
fines and/or imprisonment for persons who are deprived of their bodily in-
tegrity by state actors
The remedies provided by Section 242 seem especially beneficial after
looking at the sparse statutory remedies for victims of rape and sexual as-
sault.10 Many commentators feel that the recently enacted federal rape law is
insufficient," and that state law can be inadequate. 2 In addition, there are
certain circumstances under which state law is not used. 3 In these cases,
where statutory remedies are inadequate or inapplicable, the plaintiff will
have a federal remedy only if she can prove the defendant violated a right
secured by the Constitution. Herein lies the importance of extending the
constitutional right to bodily integrity to include rape by public officials. If
the courts do not allow the Constitution to evolve to protect the right to
8. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996). See supra note 1, for the full text of this statute. Interest-
ingly, this statute is the one hundred and twenty three year old Ku Klux Klan Act, enacted
after the Civil War to allow federal officials to prosecute Southern Sheriffs. Applying this
statute to rape and sexual assault seems to comport with the original legislative intent of
preventing abuse by state actors.
9. It is essential for application of Section 242 for the perpetrator of the crime to be a
state actor because of the "color of law" requirement. Circuit court opinions have consis-
tently held that an actual nexus between the state authority and the criminal act satisfies the
"under color of law" element. See Brief for the National Organization for Women at *27,
n.36, U.S. v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1717).
10. For example, the Violence Against Women Act [hereinafter "VAWA"] provides
for the first time that violent crimes motivated by gender are discriminatory and violate the
victim's civil rights under federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
11. See, e.g., David Frazee, An Imperfect Remedy for Imperfect Violence: The Con-
struction of Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act, 1 MIcH. J. GENDER & LAv 163
(1993).
12. Many supporters of VAWA indicate that state laws on violence against women are
not adequate to provide women with a remedy because they require proof of force, which is
difficult in circumstances when the rape involves coercion or threats. See, e.g., Sally Gold-
farb, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History,
Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, a Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York September 14, 1995, 4 J. L. & POL'Y. 391, 392
(1996).
13. For example, in the Lanier case, Judge Lanier's brother was the only local prose-
cutor so several victims explained that they were afraid to complain to local law enforce-
ment officials because the Judge was so politically connected. As a result, Judge Lanier
was charged under Section 242 rather than under state criminal laws. See Ex-Judge Cites
States' Rights in Attempt to Avoid Federal Charges that He Deprived Women of Their Con-
stitutional Rights, NASHvILLE TE-NNsEAN, July 7, 1996, at 1A. In fact, the victims were
so scared to complain that their rapes were only discovered as a result of an unrelated fed-
eral investigation into possible political corruption involving Judge Lanier and his prose-
cutor brother. See Brief for the National Organization for Women at *26, n.33, U.S. v. La-
nier, 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1717).
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bodily integrity in different contexts, namely rape and sexual assault by
public officials, then there will be a shrinling of the civil rights statute and
of the types of civil rights it will protect.14
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld a substantive due process
right to bodily integrity found within the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. Specifically, the Court has determined that the right to bodily
integrity allows women to have abortions, 5 entitles individuals to make end
of life decisions free from government intervention,' and permits families to
make birth control decisions without governmental involvement." Because
of the similarities between abortion, end of life issues, contraception choices
and rape or sexual assault, the substantive due process right that the courts
have relied upon for years should be extended to encompass rape and sexual
assault by public officials.
The Lanier prosecution raised several complex issues regarding the
scope of 18 U.S.C. §242." However, this Comment focuses specifically on
the scope of the constitutional substantive due process right to bodily integ-
rity. In light of the historical development of the right to bodily integrity
and its previous application in a variety of cases, this Comment suggests
that rape or sexual assault by a state actor violates the substantive due proc-
ess right to bodily integrity. Procedurally, the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Griswold,9 Cruzan," and Casey' should be extended to
encompass rape or sexual assault by public officials.
Several commentators have examined various forms of conduct that
violate the constitutional right to bodily integrity; however, there is little
14. See Russ Loar, Lawyer's Special Interest Pays Off Gender Bias Expert at 29 Be-
fore U.S. Supreme Court, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1997 (quoting Mary-Christine Sungaila).
Although this Comment argues that denying a constitutional right to bodily integrity would
shrink Section 242, other commentators fear that a right to bodily integrity would greatly
increase the scope of Section 242 by making assault committed by public officials subject
to federal prosecution, without any discernible limitation. See Respondent's Brief at *2,
U.S. v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1717).
15. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
16. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,277-78 (1990).
17. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. Some of the more interesting issues raised by this case include potential violations
of federalism, specifically, the possibility that conduct that would otherwise be a state
crime may be considered to be a federal crime when the commission of the crime is "under
color of law." In addition, there are vagueness concerns underlying the application of Sec-
tion 242, which punishes the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution but declines
to enumerate these rights. There are also concerns raised regarding the application of a Re-
construction Era statute to the crimes of rape and sexual assault. Finally, some commen-
tators voice opposition to allowing the Supreme Court to virtually create new due process
rights whenever a case warrants the existence of such a right. For a discussion of the fed-
eralism and vagueness concerns, see Lawrence, supra note 3.
19. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
20. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
21. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
[Vol. 34
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analysis of whether and how rape by public officials violates this right.'
Because rape by a public official is similar to the other conduct which courts
have held violates bodily integrity, it follows that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment should also include a right to be free from rape by public officials.
Historical factors support an argument in favor of extending the consti-
tutional right to bodily integrity to rape by public officialsY For example,
the courts have identified and applied the right to bodily integrity to conduct
that destroys personal autonomy much like rape and sexual assault by public
officials.24 Generally speaking, courts have applied the right to bodily integ-
rity to protect people from governmental interference with decisions about
their bodies. More specifically, courts have defined bodily integrity as
"personal privacy,"' the "right to determine what shall be done with [one's]
own body,21 6 and the "right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person."' Ultimately, despite the context, bodily integrity is the
"centuries-old right to be left alone."28
The determination of this issue will have a large impact on victims of
rape by public actors. Previously, the courts have stated that when police
excessively beat someone in custody, this violates the Constitution;29 and
yet, something seemingly more invasive, like rape, may not violate the Con-
stitution." If the courts decide that the constitutional right to bodily integ-
rity cannot be extended to cover rape and sexual assault by public officials,
this will send a message to women that the Constitution protects them from
22. The articles that mention bodily integrity as a constitutional right, without actually
analyzing whether such a right legally exists, deal with the right to die, abortion and repro-
ductive rights, and unlawful searches and seizures. Articles mentioning a right to bodily
integrity in these contexts include Samantha Catherine Halem, Note, At What Cost?: An
Argument Against Mandatory AZT Treatment of HIV-Positive Pregnant Women, 32 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 491 (1997); Randall Miller, The Limits of U.S. International Law En-
forcement After Verdugo-Urquidez: Resurrecting Rochin, 58 U. PrIT. L. REv. 867 (1997);
and Kenneth R. Thomas, Confronting End-of-Life Decisions: Should We Expand the Right
to Die?, 44 FED. LAw. 30 (1997).
23. The reasons behind the enactment of Section 242 argue in favor of recognizing a
constitutional right to bodily integrity. Intended to protect newly freed slaves from abuse
by state officials, Section 242 provides remedies for those who deprive others of constitu-
tional rights. As argued by Professor Frederick Lawrence, "[i]f we were to change gender
to race in [the Lanier case], it reads like one of those cases during the 1870s that led to the
enactment of the section 242 precursor and the cases since the 1940s that have led the De-
partment of Justice to apply and enforce this statute." Lawrence, supra note 3, at 4.
24. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833, discussed infra Part I.
25. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966)).
26. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
27. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
28. Aaron Epstein, Suicide Issue Heard, LAs VEGAS REvmw-JOURNAL, Jan. 9, 1997
(quoting New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco).
29. See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Los Angeles
police officers violated Rodney King's constitutional rights by beating him during an ar-
rest).
30. See Loar, supra note 14.
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being beaten by a public official, but it does not protect them from being
sexually violated by a public official." This mixed-message could be re-
solved by expanding bodily integrity to include the right to be free from rape
by officials.
Part I of this Comment examines cases in which the courts have recog-
nized bodily integrity in contexts other than rape and sexual assault. The
evolution of the right to bodily integrity is tracked from the right to be let
alone in the 1800s, to a substantive due process right within the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part II then analogizes rape and sexual assault to other situa-
tions where the court has applied the right to bodily integrity. Part IH ex-
amines the Violence Against Women Act, the recently created federal rape
law, and discusses why a constitutional right is also essential for victims of
rape or sexual assault by public officials. Part IV briefly discusses other al-
ternative remedies that victims of rape or sexual assault by public officials
may pursue if the courts decide that bodily integrity does not encompass
rape or sexual assault by public officials. This Comment concludes that the
courts should extend the constitutional right to bodily integrity to encom-
pass rape and sexual assault by public officials.
I. THE CASE LAW EVOLUTION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO BODILY INTEGRITY
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is a right to be free
from unjustified intrusions on personal bodily integrity, suggesting that such
a right is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." The lower courts have also recognized this right, and have applied it
in a variety of contexts. These include unsolicited medical procedures,'
forcible stomach pumping,' 5 corporal punishment in schools,36 the decision
to forego medical treatment, decisions regarding birth control,38 and abor-
31. See id. The focus on rape and sexual assault by public officials is the pivotal point
of this Comment since only a state actor can violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
some may argue that the problem of rape by public officials is not widespread enough to
warrant a constitutional violation for rape by officials, it may be more common than ex-
pected due to the unequal positions of power between victims and officials. Specifically,
the power to coerce and manipulate victims may be greater when the perpetrator holds a
powerful position, such as a judge or a police officer. See supra note 7 for the Department
of Justice statistics on the number of prosecutions of this sort.
32. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, see supra note 6 for the text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
33. See id For example, the right to bodily integrity has been implicated in lower
court decisions regarding abortion, forced Cesarean sections, and blood tests to determine
blood alcohol levels.
34. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 41 U.S. 250 (1891).
35. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
36. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
37. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
38 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[Vol. 34
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tion."9 The progression of bodily integrity in the courts from the right to be
let alone, to a well founded substantive due process right, helps define the
scope of this right and supports its expansion into the arena of rape by pub-
lic officials.
A. Early Bodily Integrity: The Right to Be Let Alone
Beginning in the 1800s, courts have treated bodily integrity as a right
protected by the Constitution."0 In Botsford, the Supreme Court held that
the lower court had no right to order the plaintiff to submit to a surgical
exam without her consent." Justice Gray reasoned: "[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint and interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.42
Quoting Judge Cooley, Justice Gray added that "the right to one's per-
son may be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be let [sic] alone. 4 3
This is one of the first, indefinite references to bodily integrity, and since
Botsford, many courts have followed Justice Gray's interpretation of the
right.
Applying similar reasoning to a less physically intrusive invasion of
privacy, Justice Brandeis dissented from the Supreme Court's decision in
Olmstead v. United States.' In Olmstead, the Court upheld the use of wire
tapping to secure convictions of several defendants under the National Pro-
hibition Act.45 Expressing concern with the Court's reasoning, Justice Bran-
deis indicated that the protections guaranteed by the Constitution are much
broader in scope than as construed by the majority.46 In his dissent, Justice
Brandeis explained that:
[t]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.... They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.47
Applying the right to be let alone, Brandeis determined that wire tap-
39. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
40. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
41. Id at 257.
42. Id. at 251.
43. Id. (quoting JuDGE COOLBY, COOLEY oN TORTS 29 (1st ed. 1888)).
44. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
45. IdM at 469.
46. See id. at 478.
47. Id.
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ping is a crime that should not be used to secure convictions.48
B. Modem Bodily Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach
Substantive Due Process is the constitutional guaranty that no person
can be arbitrarily deprived of his life, liberty, or property.49 Specifically,
substantive due process provides protection from arbitrary and unreasonable
action by government actors."0
The liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "is not a series of points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press and religion; ... and so on. It is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial and arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints."'" Over the
years, courts have used the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause to
protect various invasions on bodily integrity. A brief overview of the cases
in which courts have applied the right to bodily integrity to areas of personal
autonomy and family decisions demonstrates the logic in extending this
right to encompass rape by public officials.
The Supreme Court recognized and protected the substantive due proc-
ess right to bodily integrity in Rochin v. People of California.52 In Rochin,
the Court held that sheriffs violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when they forced defendant to turn over evidence by forcibly
inducing him to vomit.5 3 Justice Frankfurter explained, forcing defendant to
vomit did "more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sen-
timentalism about combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that
shocks the conscience."' This action was "bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities. [It was] too close to the rack and the screw to permit of [sic]
constitutional differentiation., 55
Faced with an even more egregious violation of bodily integrity, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut statute imposing fines or impris-
onment for "any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument
for the purpose of preventing conception." 56 In Griswold, the Director of
Planned Parenthood and a physician who gave medical advice about contra-
ception to married couples were found guilty as accessories under the Con-
necticut law.' The Court invalidated the statute as violative of the due
48. See id. at 479.
49. See Babineaux v. Judiciary Commission, 341 So. 2d 396, 400 (La. 1976).
50. See iL
51. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961).
52. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
53. Id at 174.
54. Id. at 172.
55. Ii
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,480 (1965).
57. 1l at 480.
[Vol. 34
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process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that "specific guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy.""
Shortly after Griswold, the Supreme Court was faced with an even
greater restriction of bodily integrity. In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade,
the Supreme Court held that the right of privacy, founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action,
"is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy."" The Court explained that, although "Itihe Constitu-
tion does not explicitly mention any right of privacy .... the Court has rec-
ognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."6
In an entirely different context, the Supreme Court upheld a person's
right "generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."6 In Ingraham,
the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not require notice prior to the imposition of corporal punishment in
public schools.62 In Ingraham, the Court reasoned that "[a]mong the historic
liberties so protected was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial re-
lief, for unjustified intrusions on personal security."'63 The Court applied
this right to be free from intrusions on personal security to students who
were subjected to corporal punishment at school without consent.' The
Court concluded that, in order to satisfy the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, intrusions by officials on personal security must, at a
minimum, be justified by a permissible governmental purpose.65
The Supreme Court has also applied the right to bodily integrity to
cases where the patient chooses to forego medical treatment. In Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court held that the Constitu-
tion does not forbid Missouri from requiring clear and convincing evidence66
of an incompetent person's wishes to be withdrawn from life sustaining
58. 1& at 484.
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
60. Id at 152.
61. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
62. a at 683.
63. I& at 673.
64. See id. at 651.
65. See id. at 675.
66. The clear and convincing evidence standard is an intermediate standard of proof
that falls between the preponderance of the evidence standard and the criminal beyond the
reasonable doubt standard. It is noteworthy that the Cruzan court applied this standard be-
cause it requires more proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard to show an
incompetent person's wishes.
9
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treatment.' The Court explained that the "notion of bodily integrity has
been embodied in the requirement that informed consent is generally re-
quired for medical treatment."6 In Cruzan, Justice Rehnquist referred to
Cardozo's early definition of bodily integrity, stating that, "[elvery human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body."69
Two years later, in the abortion context, the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution places limits on a state's right to interfere with a person's
most basic decisions about family, parenthood and bodily integrity. 70 In Ca-
sey, the court upheld its prior decision in Roe v. Wade7' recognizing a
woman's right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability.72 The
Court reasoned that the right to bodily integrity in the abortion context is
"implicit in the meaning of liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.73 For example, certain "attributes of personhood" are recognized as so
fundamental that they receive protection under the Due Process Clause as a
matter of substantive liberty.74
Finally, the right to bodily integrity protects women against forced Ce-
sarean sections.7 ' Therefore, orders to compel women to undergo Cesarean
sections, like late term abortions, can be justified only when necessary for
the survival of the fetus.76 In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital
Authority, the court ordered the mother of an unborn child to submit to a
Cesarean section although the mother was opposed to the surgery because of
religious beliefs.77 The mother was thirty-nine weeks pregnant and suffering
from placenta previa, a condition which was impossible to cure before
childbirth.7' Due to the severity of the condition, the doctors estimated that
the child had only a one percent chance of surviving natural child birth, and
that the mother had only a fifty percent chance of surviving natural child
birth.79 However, if a Cesarean section were performed, both the mother and
the child would have a 100 percent chance of survival. 0 The court found
67. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,282 (1990).
68. Id. at 269.
69. Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914)).
70. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
71. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.
73. I1d at 869.
74. Id
75. See Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents' Freedom to Have Children With Genetic
Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 761,786 (1995).
76. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga.
1981). But see In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (IIl. App. Ct. 1994).
77. Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
78. See id. at 458.
79. See id.
80. See id,
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that the duty of the State to protect a living, unborn human being from
meeting his or her death before being given the opportunity to live out-
weighed the intrusion upon the life (and body) of the mother."1
More recently however, two appellate courts have not permitted a
forced Cesarean section even to protect the fetus, suggesting that the
mother's right to select medical birth methods is even more fundamental
than the right to terminate a pregnancy. In both In re A. C. and In re Baby
Boy Doe the courts upheld the right of the pregnant woman to determine the
course of medical treatment for herself and her fetus, even where the
woman's choice may be harmful to the fetus.82 Both courts described the
right of the pregnant woman as one of bodily integrity derived from com-
mon law and the Constitution.83 In In re Baby Boy Doe, the court reasoned
that "a woman's right to refuse invasive medical treatment, derived from her
rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is not diminished
during pregnancy.19
As evidenced throughout the common law evolution of bodily integrity,
the courts rely on the substantive due process right to privacy or bodily in-
tegrity whenever the government impinges upon a person's autonomy over
his or her body. The progression of bodily integrity in the courts confirms
that the Supreme Court recognizes and protects people from governmental
invasions on personal security. Therefore, since the courts have consistently
held that the right to bodily integrity encompasses unwanted surgery, com-
pulsory pregnancies and mandated contraception methods, the courts should
hold that the right encompasses rape by public officials.
II. THE RATIONAL CONTINUUM: FREEDOM FROM RAPE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS AS COMPARED TO OTHER RIGHTS
ENCOMPASSED BY BODILY INTEGRITY
An examination of specific scenarios in which the Supreme Court has
applied the substantive due process right to bodily integrity supports an ex-
pansion of this right. This comparison is predicated on the theory that the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is not a series of isolated
points, but instead, a rational continuum which includes freedom from all
substantial, arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." As such, gen-
eral constitutional references to liberty and due process seen throughout the
cases in Part I include privacy and bodily integrity."
81. See id. at 460.
82. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (IlL. App. CL 1994).
83. See Shepherd, supra note 75, at 786 (citing In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at
330-31).
84. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 332.
85. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,543 (1961).
86. This Comment focuses specifically on bodily integrity because this term is most
clearly implicated by rape. However, bodily integrity seems to be merely a subsection of
11
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A. Bodily Integrity Encompasses Mandated Methods of Contraception
The right to bodily integrity was early recognized under the right to pri-
vacy doctrine in Griswold. In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the right
to privacy to include the right to control one's own bodily functions, such as
avoidance of unwanted pregnancy.' As discussed in Part I, the physician
who was charged under the statute merely advised a married couple about
the means of preventing pregnancy.8 The Court held that forbidding the use
of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital pri-
vacy.89 In addition, the Court stated that state mandated contraception
methods are "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship."9
Like mandated contraception, rape and sexual assault are repulsive to
the notions of privacy over one's body. If a state cannot force people to re-
frain from using contraception, a fortiori, a state cannot force people to
submit to rape by public officials. Just as mandated contraception seeks to
achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon the
marital relationship, forced sex has a maximum destructive impact on the
victim.
The Court in Griswold facetiously hypothesized the situation where po-
lice search marital bedrooms for contraceptives, and indicated that this
would never be allowed in a free society." However, rape and sexual assault
by public officials are even more invasive than the search of one's bedroom;
and yet they continue to go unnoticed under the Constitution. If the sub-
stantive due process right within the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
state mandated contraception, it should necessarily be extended to protect
against rape by officials.
B. Bodily Integrity Encompasses Unwanted Surgery
Moving forward along the substantive due process continuum to Cru-
zan, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution did not forbid Missouri
from requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes
regarding the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment.92 However, more im-
portant to this analysis is the Court's determination that a competent person
has a liberty interest under the due process clause in refusing unwanted
privacy, which is merely a subsection of liberty. Therefore, despite what each individual
court calls it, this right protects against violations against one's person.
87. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88. See id at 481.
89. See id. at 485-86.
90. Id at 486.
91. Id
92. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,282 (1990).
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medical treatment.93 In fact, the Court found that a competent person has the
right to refuse life saving nutrition and hydration.94
Like forced medical procedures, rape and sexual assault violates the
right to bodily integrity. If the state cannot force people to accept life sus-
taining treatment, it follows that the state cannot force people to have sex
against their will- After Cruzan, it is clear that compelling people to con-
tinue with medical treatment violates the right to possession and control
over one's person. Likewise, compelling victims to submit to unwanted in-
tercourse even more strongly violates the right to possession and control
over one's person. If the Constitution protects the right to die, it should also
protect the right to choose sexual partners.
C. Bodily Integrity Encompasses Compulsory Pregnancies
Finally, in Roe and later in Casey, the Supreme Court protected the
right to control over one's body, or bodily integrity.95 In Roe, the Supreme
Court held that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is a liberty pro-
tected against state interference by the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Upholding the Court's de-
cision in Roe, the Court in Casey held, in part, that the undue burden test
should be used to evaluate abortion restrictions before viability, and that the
spousal notification provision of the statute imposed an undue burden on
pregnant women.'
In Casey, Justice Blackmun found that state restrictions on abortion
violate a woman's right to privacy in two ways.98 First, he argued that
"compelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a woman's right to
bodily integrity by imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant
risks of physical harm."" He added that labor and delivery impose health
risks and physical demands on women.' Accordingly, "restrictive abortion
laws force women to endure physical invasions far more substantial than
those this Court has held to violate the constitutional principle of bodily in-
tegrity in other contexts."''
Second, restrictive abortion statutes also deprive women of the right to
93. See id. at 278.
94. See id.
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
96. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (referring to Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
97. L at 899.
98. Id at 927.
99. Id
100. See id
101. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 927 (1992)
(citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952)).
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make their own decisions about reproduction and family planning."°
Blackmun argued that the decision to terminate a pregnancy has no less an
impact on women's lives than decisions about contraception or marriage. 3
Thus, because motherhood has such an impact on women's education and
employment opportunities, restrictive abortion laws deprive women of the
basic control over their lives."°
Forced sex violates a woman's right to bodily integrity in the same
ways restrictive abortion legislation violates bodily integrity. First, forced
sex, like forced pregnancy, imposes substantial physical intrusions and sig-
nificant risks of physical harm on the woman. In fact, women are more
likely to experience physical harm during rape than in pregnancies. Second,
rape is the ultimate way to deprive women of the basic control over their
lives. Like choosing whether to terminate a pregnancy, choosing one's sex-
ual partners involves the "most intimate and personal choices a person can
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy."'' 5
Therefore, if the constitutional right to bodily integrity protects against
compulsory pregnancy, it should also protect against the even more intrusive
violation of personhood, namely rape.
D. Bodily Integrity Should Encompass Rape by Public Officials
The right to bodily integrity is the essence of the constitutional right to
privacy, as the Supreme Court recognized in Griswold, Cruzan, and Casey.
In those cases, the Supreme Court afforded constitutional protection to per-
sonal decisions relating to contraception, medical procedures and abortion.
If substantive due process encompasses protection against mandated meth-
ods of contraception, forced medical procedures and compulsory pregnan-
cies, surely it encompasses compulsory intercourse or sexual advances by
public officials. Because rape implicates the same violations of personal
autonomy and control over one's body as the conduct the Court has already
determined violates the right to bodily integrity, the courts should apply the
decisions in Griswold, Cruzan, and Casey to rape by public officials. In so
doing, courts will expand the constitutional right to bodily integrity to en-
compass rape by officials. In fact, applying bodily integrity to rape by offi-
cials fits well within the rational continuum of substantive due process and
is consistent with precedent.
Ultimately, if bodily integrity is not expanded to encompass rape by
public officials, there will be a shrinking of the types of civil rights that 18
U.S.C. §242 covers."6 Once bodily integrity is extended to cover rape by
102. See id
103. See id
104. See id. at 928.
105. Id. at 851.
106. See Loar, supra note 14.
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public officials, the Fourteenth Amendment will protect against compulsory
sex, just as it currently protects against compulsory contraception methods,
medical care, and pregnancy.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING BODILY INTEGRITY TO ENCOMPASS
RAPE BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS: THE INADEQUACY OF RAPE LAW
Extending the constitutional right to bodily integrity to cover rape by
public officials is essential, especially in light of the inadequacy of rape
legislation. In America, a woman is raped every six minutes.'" This means
one in five adult women will be raped at some point in their lives. ' How-
ever, both the state and federal rape laws fail to provide victims of rape with
an adequate remedy.' 9
A. The Inadequacy of State Rape Laws
The primary problem with state rape laws is that most states still require
the victim to prove force or threat of force as an element of rape.' 0 The
problem is, "unwanted, coerced and violative sex does not always require
force."' This is especially relevant to the discussion of rape by public offi-
cials, since, due to their positions of authority, public officials may exercise
coercion but no actual force."'
107. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 189 (1991).
108. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 77 (1990).
109. See Kerrie E. Maloney, Gender Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause:
The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act after Lopez, 96 COLUM. L.
REv. 1876 (1996); see also Frazee, supra note 11. State rape laws often require the victim
to prove force. This is problematic for two reasons. First, rape does not always require
force, since coercion or some quid pro quo situation may be frightening enough for the
victim to submit to rape, albeit against her will. Second, this puts the onus on the victim to
prove that the perpetrator used force and it opens the door for the defense to question the
victim's motives, for example, whether she actually wanted and consented to the sex and
changed her mind after the fact. Federal rape law, specifically VAWA, relies on state law
definitions of crimes of violence, which provides victims only as much protection as the
state law provides. In addition, it may be difficult to prove that rape is a crime of violence,
especially rape by coercion or manipulation, since rape does not always involve actual
physical force.
110. See Maloney, supra note 109.
111. Id at 1888. In support of the argument that not all rapes entail force or violence,
see Sally I. Bowie et al., Blitz Rape and Confidence Rape: Implications for Clinical Inter-
vention, 64 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 180 (1990) (explaining that "confidence rape" entails
"some nonviolent interaction between the rapist and the victim before the attacker's inten-
tion to commit rape emerges").
112. For example, in the Lanier case, Judge Lanier implicitly conditioned a victim's
receipt of child support payments on his receipt of oral sex. Although he used no actual
force, the coercion was equally reprehensible behavior. This type of coercion is analogous
to cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment, where the employer conditions some benefit to
15
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Another problem with state rape laws is that criminal trials, applying
state laws, are often hostile settings for victims of rape and sexual assault.'
For example, the victim is often placed under more scrutiny than the defen-
dant"4 and has very little control over the strategy the prosecution chooses to
pursue."' A trial in federal court, applying the federal rape shield laws,' 6
would allow the victim to have more control over her own case." 7
B. The Inadequacy of the Violence Against Women Act
The inadequacy of state laws in addressing the nation-wide problem of
violence against women led to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
("VAWA")." 8 The VAWA provides the first civil rights remedy to victims
of gender motivated violence."9 The VAWA provides, in pertinent part:
[a] person... who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and
thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this sec-
tion shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief,
and other such relief as the court may deem appropriate.'
This section, like the state laws that require force, requires "crimes of
violence." The requirement for "crimes of violence" can be satisfied only
the employee on acquiescence to his sexual advances. However, although sexual harass-
ment can be a serious crime, which can include physical contact in the form of sexual as-
sault, it is also a civil law term which includes non-contact abuse. See Amicus Brief of the
National Organization for Women, U.S. v. Lanier, 1996 WL 468603, at *23.
113. See Carolyn Peri Weiss, Title III of the Violence Against Women Act: Constitu-
tionally Safe and Sound, 75 WASH. UNIv. LAW Q. 723 n.17 (1997) (citing Frazee, supra
note 11, at 254).
114. In rape prosecutions applying state law, the federal rape shield statutes do not ap-
ply. Therefore, a victim may be questioned about her past sexual history, as well as her
current sexuality, raising inferences that the victim actually wanted or even initiated the
sexual relations.
115. See Weiss, supra note 113.
116. See FED. R. EVID. 412 is also known as the "rape shield law." Rule 412 states in
pertinent part:
(a) The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding
involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in (b) and (c): (1) Evi-
dence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
State evidence codes differ in this area.
117. See id. Weiss considers the possibility that, by allowing the victim to control her
own case, "the case itself would become part of the remedy that functions to restore equal-
ity" See Weiss, supra note 113 (citing Sara E. Lesch, A Troubled Inheritance: An Exami-
nation of Title II of the Violence Against Women Act in Light of Current Critiques of Civil
Rights Law, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 535, 539 (1993)).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) [hereinafter "VAWA"].
119. See Maloney, supra note 109.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
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by violent felonies." As discussed above, not all rapes or sexual assaults
include traditional forms of violence. Unfortunately, the VAWA definition
of "crimes of violence" relies on state law definitions which are often inade-
quate." Finally, the VAWA is also inadequate since it may not be consti-tutional."
The inadequacy of the VAWA is best seen by examining its track rec-
ord. There have been only three cases brought under the VAWA since its
enactment in 1994.124 Surely, with the statistics referred to above, women
are clearly not using the VAWA as a remedy for rape. This may be due in
part to the excessive level of force that women are required to prove under
the VAWA, or the lack of knowledge that a federal rape statute exists.
Therefore, given the above critiques of state and federal rape law, al-
lowing victims of rape to bring suit under Section 242 (via a constitutional
right to bodily integrity) would provide alternate remedies for victims of
rape and sexual assault by officials. It would alleviate the challenges of
proving force under state law, or traditional violence under federal law. In
addition, applying Section 242 to rape by public officials appears to comply
with the legislative intent behind Section 242. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that one of the main reasons for the passage of Section 242 was "to af-
ford a federal right... because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced, and the claims of
citizens to the enjoyment of rights . . . guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies."'" Because rape by
public officials may often involve situations where state laws are not en-
forced, acknowledging a right to bodily integrity and applying Section 242
to the deprivation of this right would grant victims a more reliable basis for
121. See Frazee, supra note 11, at 169. Frazee points out that, because of VAWA's
excessive force requirement, victims of sexual assault may have to prove force beyond the
definition of the crime itself. This appears to be a harsh requirement, especially given the
sensitive nature of rape and sexual assault.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2); see also Frazee, supra note 11 (arguing that it
seems absurd to create a federal civil rights remedy "dependent on the very state laws
whose inadequacies are part of the justification for the federal remedy itself').
123. In light of Congress' potentially diminishing Commerce Clause power under U.S.
v. Lopez, violence against women may not sufficiently affect interstate commerce to be
regulated by Congress. Since there is the possibility that this statute will not withstand ju-
dicial scrutiny in the future, the VAWA cannot be considered a sufficient remedy for vic-
tims of rape and sexual assault. See Frazee, supra note 11; Brzonkala v. Virginia Poly-
technic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding that VAWA was not
within the authority of Congress, either under the Commerce Clause or the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Weiss, supra note 113 (arguing that
VAWA is constitutional even after U.S. v. Lopez).
124. See Doe v. Abbott Lab., 892 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. La. 1995) (Section (c) of the
VAWA does not apply retroactively); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (a
domestic violence case); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
125. Abramowitz, supra note 2 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961)).
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recovery against an oppressive local regime.'
IV. OTHER POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE INADEQUACY OF FEDERAL
RAPE REMEDIES
Because neither federal nor state rape laws provide victims of rape by
public officials an adequate remedy, the courts should extend the constitu-
tional right to bodily integrity to cover these situations. However, if the
courts do not extend the right to bodily integrity to cover rape by public of-
ficials, there are two other potential remedies available.
A. Legislation that Affirms an Individual's Interest in Bodily Integrity
One possible solution in the event the Court does not extend the right to
bodily integrity to rape or sexual assault by public officials is for individuals
to encourage their legislators to adopt legislation that reaffirms the privacy
interest and interest in bodily autonomy established in the Constitution.'
What this suggests is not a new rape law per se, but a law recognizing bod-
ily integrity as a right that all people share and punishing those who violate
this right. Therefore, this potential new legislation would still provide a
remedy for the other crimes covered under 18 U.S.C.A. §242 such as abuse
by prison guards' and excessive force by police officers; 9 however, it
would more specifically cover rape and sexual abuse by public officials.
B. Constitutional Amendment
Another possible solution to the problem of rape or sexual assault by
public officials is a constitutional amendment. However, given the diffi-
culty of the amendment process,' this seems like a last resort to be pursued
only if legislation is not created to protect bodily integrity or the courts find
that bodily integrity is not a right secured by the Constitution.
126. Because Section 242 requires only a showing of a deprivation of rights secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, committed under color of law, victims would
need to show only that the perpetrator was acting in his official capacity when he deprived
her of her bodily integrity.
127. This solution was suggested by Sally Sutton in her article, Medical Data Banks
Threaten Privacy: Policy Makers and Health Care Providers Need to Take More Precau-
tions to Protect Patient Information, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Feb. 16, 1997, at Al. Al-
though this article deals with privacy issues in medical records, the same solution would
work for the issue of rape or sexual assault by public officials.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Georvassilis, 498 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1974).
129. See, e.g., U.S. v. Koon, 34F.3d 1416 (1994).
130. The process to amend the Constitution is very difficult and has been done only
four times. Specifically, a proposal requires two-thirds of both houses or two-thirds of the
states, and ratification requires three-quarters of all states.
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Several groups have already expressed interest in a constitutional
amendment if the courts do not acknowledge a constitutional right to bodily
integrity. For example, the National Organization for Women ("NOW") has
already indicated that it will move forward in an attempt to amend the Con-
stitution if such a right is not established.' The administrative head of
NOW claims any constitutional amendment on this subject will "be broader
than the Equal Rights Amendment of the 1970s. It [will] include the right
to freedom of bodily integrity of [one's] person."''
V. CONCLUSION
In an era when police officers are raping women who call for help,'33
when border patrol agents are coercing sexual favors from illegal aliens,"
the President of the United States has been charged with sexual assault,'35
and judges are demanding sexual favors from litigants or court employees,
cases like the Lanier prosecution illustrate possible actions for victims of
rape or sexual assault by public officials.
The Supreme Court has not yet extended the right to bodily integrity to
include unwanted sex-and recently, the Court denied certiorari in Lanier v.
U.S. Nevertheless, this issue will likely return to the High Court for resolu-
tion in a future case based on similar facts. When it does, the Court should
extend the right to bodily integrity to encompass rape and sexual assault by
public officials. Such an extension is consistent with substantive due proc-
ess precedent and the rational continuum the Court has been creating for
decades.
By extending the right to bodily integrity to cover rape by public offi-
cials, the courts could then use Section 242 to vindicate the strong federal
interest in preventing assaults by state actors.' Moreover, application of
Section 242 (via a constitutional right to bodily integrity) to rape by public
131. See Catherine Trevison, More Than a Matter of Molesting, TENNESSAN, Jan. 12,
1997, at 1D. The head of the National Organization for Women ("NOW") and NOW's
communications director have already written and distributed a press release on the possi-
bility of amending the Constitution to protect women's rights.
132. Id. (quoting Ms. Ireland, Head of NOW).
133. See Two Police Officers Jailed in Rape Case, S.D. UNIoN TRmUNE, Sept. 21,
1997, at A6.
134. See United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1983).
135. Paula Jones brought a lawsuit against President Clinton in 1994, alleging that
Clinton sexually assaulted her in 1991 while he was Governor of Arkansas. Although the
case was dismissed on April 1, 1998, it illustrates the possible applications for the exten-
sion of the right to bodily integrity.
136. See Brief for the National Organization for Women at *3, n.33, U.S. v. Lanier, 73
F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1717). Although this Comment focuses on the Lanier
case, involving a judge, recognition of a right to bodily integrity would impose penalties on
all types of state actors including police, border patrol, and customs officers; members of
the armed services; and even the President, who would not be above the Constitution of the
United States.
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officials would have societal impact of great significance. First, criminally
punishing state officials for rape would recognize the severity of the
crime.'37 It would send a message to potential state officials that the crime
of rape is of such magnitude that committing it is punishable as a violation
of civil rights. It would also send a message to victims that they were de-
prived of a constitutional right, thus adding validity to the victims' claims.
Second, application of Section 242 to rape by state officials would fur-
ther the federal interest in uniform application of the laws."' For the reasons
discussed above, state laws may be inadequate to punish state officials for
rape and sexual assault, or state officials may be hesitant to take action
against one another. Accordingly, application of Section 242, by way of a
constitutional right to bodily integrity, would ensure that public officials are
punished regardless of limitations on state law remedies. 39
Finally, because one of the primary purposes of the Constitution is to
protect individual liberty, it is appropriate that it be invoked to protect vic-
tims of rape and sexual assault by state actors. Judge Martha Craig
Daughtrey, who dissented from the Court of Appeals' decision in U.S. v.
Lanier, argued that "personal security and bodily integrity [are] precious
rights protected not only by the U.S. Constitution but by all free and civi-
lized societies."'4 Thus, it follows that a civilized society such as ours
would allow constitutional redress for victims of rape by officials who have
used their positions of power to coerce and ultimately to scar people under
their control.
Stephanie Weiler*
137. See i& at *4.
138. See id. at *25.
139. See id.
140. Trevison, supra note 131 (referring to U.S. v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997)).
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